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We analyze how different dimensions of a seller’s reputation affect pricing power in electronic markets. We do
so by using text mining techniques to identify and structure dimensions of importance from feedback posted
on reputation systems, by aggregating and scoring these dimensions based on the sentiment they contain,
and using them to estimate a series of econometric models associating reputation with price premiums. We
find that different dimensions do indeed affect pricing power differentially, and that a negative reputation
hurts more than a positive one helps on some dimensions but not on others. We provide the first evidence
that sellers of identical products in electronic markets differentiate themselves based on a distinguishing
dimension of strength, and that buyers vary in the relative importance they place on different fulfilment
characteristics. We highlight the importance of textual reputation feedback further by demonstrating it
substantially improves the performance of a classifier we have trained to predict future sales. This paper is
the first study that integrates econometric, text mining and predictive modeling techniques toward a more
complete analysis of the information captured by reputation systems, and it presents new evidence of the
importance of their effective and judicious design.
Key words : Reputation, Reputation Systems, Text Mining, Opinion Mining, Online Feedback, Electronic
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1. Introduction
We show how pricing power in electronic markets is affected by different dimensions of a seller’s
reputation, which are identified by mining the text feedback of buyers. We demonstrate that
different dimensions affect pricing power differently, contrast positive and negative reputation along
each dimension, and provide evidence that buyers value dimensions differentially, often purchasing
based on the fulfilment dimension a seller is differentiated on. Our results are based on a series
of econometric models and are further validated by demonstrating substantive improvements in a
predictive model based on our theory and data.
The motivation for our study is simple. When buyers purchase products in an electronic market,
they assess and pay not only for the product they wish to purchase, but for a set of fulfillment
characteristics as well: packaging, timeliness of delivery, the extent to which the product description
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matches the actual product, and reliability of settlement, for example. In traditional (bricks and
mortar) retailing where buyers and seller are often co-located, buyers have cues that help them
determine retailers’ fulfillment characteristics more easily. These characteristics cannot be reliably
described or verified in an electronic market prior to a transaction. If the intermediary running
the market does not guarantee these characteristics, such markets rely on reputation systems to
signal the quality of the trade processes one takes for granted in face-to-face and collocated trans-
actions. The importance of such systems is widely recognized in the academic literature (surveys
are available in Resnick et al. (2000), Dellarocas (2003), and Resnick et al. (2006)).
Typically, reputation in electronic markets are encoded by a “reputation profile” that provides
potential buyers with:
1. The number of transactions the seller has successfully completed,
2. A summary of scores (or ratings) from buyers who have completed transactions with the seller
in the past, and
3. A chronological list of textual feedback provided by these buyers.
Studies of reputation systems thus far have typically used average numerical scores reported by
buyers as their measure of reputation. However, trade processes are multidimensional. Sellers vary
in their capabilities at delivery, packaging, customer service and so on. Buyers may value each of
these fulfilment dimensions differently, and there may be heterogeneity across buyers about the
relative importance of different dimensions
Our study is based on the notion that the qualitative information contained in text-based feedback
can be used to unravel these different dimensions of reputation. Prior work has conjectured that
feedback text might contain information of economic value (e.g., Ba and Pavlou 2002, Cabral and
Hortac¸su 2005). Further, casual observation of mediated electronic markets does suggests that
different sellers in these markets derive their reputation from different characteristics. Text-based
descriptions of transaction quality contain buyer assessments of these characteristics which might
augment and increase the richness of the information contained in numerical reputation scores.
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We begin our analysis by developing our ideas of multidimensional reputation qualitatively,
based largely on prior theories and prior studies of reputation systems. This is augmented by a
simple model of pricing choices made by sellers who have different (and varying) abilities to fulfill
different characteristics of transactions. Buyers make inferences about a seller’s true characteristics
based on their interpretation of its feedback profile, which comprises numerical and text-based
information about the observed seller characteristics for each of their prior transactions. This
analysis leads to a set of hypothesis, which briefly, conjecture that sellers with a higher frequency of
positive assessments on each of these characteristics can successfully charge higher prices, that these
characteristics may be of varying importance, that buyers value different characteristics differently,
and that the ”differentiating dimension” of a seller contributes disproportionately to its pricing
power.
Next, using a text mining technique we have developed and implemented, we structure the
text feedback in the reputation profile of each seller who has participated in at least one of over
9,500 transactions for the sale of packaged consumer software on Amazon.com. Our text mining
technique identifies the simple dimensions associated with a seller’s recorded reputation (examples
of simple dimensions include “delivery” and “packaging”) and then locates the modifiers associated
with each dimension (examples of such modifiers include “fast delivery” and “careless packaging”),
thus converting unstructured text feedback for a seller into a vector of dimension-modifier pairs.
We aggregate the top-500 such pairs into a set of eight topics (or fulfilment dimensions), each
corresponding to a well-defined real-world fulfilment characteristic or trade process, and associated
with a specific sentiment (positive, neutral or negative).
We test the our hypotheses by estimating a series of models. Our baseline estimation associates
the average numerical score associated with a seller’s reputation and the level of experience (that
is, the number of transactions in the seller’s profile) with the premium in price the seller can
command over other sellers who simultaneously have an identical product available at the time the
transaction takes place. A higher average reputation and a higher level of experience sometimes
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increase pricing power, but this is not always the case. We conjecture that the baseline estimates
that associate an increase in reputation with a decrease in pricing power do so because they do
not account for unobserved heterogeneity across fulfilment dimensions.
Next, we calibrate a scoring function that assigns dimension-specific pricing premium scores to
each of the modifiers we have mined. These scores isolate the information contained explicitly
in the text feedback of a seller’s profile, and are aggregated by topic into a normalized score for
each fulfilment dimension. We test our main hypotheses using these aggregated dimensions and
scores. We demonstrate that certain dimensions have more influence than others. For the most
part, increases in the scores associated with positive reputation along each dimension lead to
higher pricing premium, and vice versa. Further we show that the dimension that differentiates the
seller —the fulfilment characteristics on which the seller’s performance relative to its competitors
is highest— independently explains variation in pricing power, even after accounting for average
differences in scores across the dimensions. This is interesting because it is consistent with a theory
that buyers are heterogeneous with respect to the dimensions they value, since revealed preference
suggests that the successful buyer weighs what the seller is good at more heavily.
We provide additional evidence of the importance of the information contained in textual feed-
back by reporting on fairly substantial improvements in the power of a predictive model we have
trained to assess which seller among a competing groups is likely to successfully transact. With
just numerical reputation information, its accuracy is 0.74. When given access to the information
in textual feedback, this performance improves by about 20%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our research in two related liter-
atures: empirical studies of online reputation systems, and opinion mining research computational
linguistics. Section 3 develops our hypothesis.1 Section 4 describes our data set and presents some
baseline results. Section 5 describes our text mining approach, its application on identifying and
scoring different dimensions of reputation, and Section 6 presents evidence that supports our main
1 Appendix A contains our analytical framework and the theory that leads to our hypothesis.
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hypotheses. Section 7 discusses the managerial implications of our findings by describing tools
that can be built using our findings, which can improve the design of existing reputation systems.
Finally, Section 8 concludes and outlines directions for future research.
2. Related work
Our paper adds to a growing literature on reputation systems. Most prior work has estimated
hedonic regressions of absolute price that view reputation as a product characteristic (though their
details vary in important ways). Their results often attribute a positive value to a good reputation:
buyers pay more to sellers who have better histories. For example, Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001)
study Palm Pilots and PDAs, and Melnik and Alm (2002) study gold coins; each of these studies
finds that positive feedback increases prices while negative feedback decreases prices. Lucking-
Reiley et al. (2000) finds that a 1% increase in negative feedback leads to a 0.11% decrease in the
final bid price for gold coins. Dewan and Hsu (2004) find that the eBay reputation system has a
significant but economically modest effect on final auction prices and likelihood of sale. However,
the results of prior studies are not directionally consistent. For example, Eaton (2002) finds that
negative feedback reduces the probability of sale of electronic guitars only for sellers with more than
20 feedback postings; Livingston (2002) finds that experienced sellers with positive feedback earn
premiums over new sellers with no feedback, but cannot establish any effect of negative feedback.
Cabral and Hortac¸su (2005) identify a significant effect of reputation on pricing power only after
eBay changed its display in 2003. McDonald and Slawson (2002) find that more negative feedback
actually increases the number of bidders in secondary market auctions. Ghose et al. (2006) are
unable to find evidence relating seller reputation to used book prices at Amazon. Resnick et al.
(2006) organized a series of controlled field experiments selling postcards on eBay to identify the
effect of experience and reputation rating on sales. Their findings suggest that buyers are willing
to pay approximately 8% more for lots sold by the more experienced seller identity rather than the
new venders. They also find that negative feedback has little impact on sales.
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We believe that a fraction of this conflicting evidence can be explained by a using a more robust
measure of the value of reputation – a price premium, rather than simply absolute price, and by
recognizing that reputation is multidimensional.2 We explicitly incorporate both these features.
In contrast with the prior literature, we use publicly available differences in posted prices for
homogeneous products of constant quality as our measure of value, which mitigates some of the
variation caused by product heterogeneity and by bidding psychology on the closing auction prices
that form the basis for other studies.3
We also add to an emerging literature which combines economic methods with text mining.
This includes Das and Chen (2006) who extract investor sentiment from bulletin boards on Yahoo!
Finance and show it explains stock index movement well, Gu et al. (2007) who analyze the trade-
offs between network size and information quality relating to how users value online communities,
and Lewitt and Syverson (2005) who study how textual descriptions of housing characteristics
affect final sale prices and time-to-sale by agents.
To the best of our knowledge, however, ours is the first paper that uses text mining techniques to
analyze reputation feedback. This seems like a very natural context for these techniques, since there
are few substitutes for the information contained in textual reputation feedback in an electronic
market (this is in contrast with investor sentiment, housing or product reviews). Two earlier papers
that have a similar motivation are Pavlou and Gefen (2005) and Pavlou and Dimoka (2006).
The former relates aspects of text feedback to psychological contract violation and the second
relates text feedback to buyer trust and pricing on eBay. However, they rely on manual (and
expensive) content analysis techniques. Further, the latter paper pre-specifies two trust dimensions
(credibility and benevolence). As a consequence, only a small proportion of text comments are
categorized as providing evidence of a seller’s outstanding credibility and benevolence. In contrast,
2 This is consistent with prior marketing theory suggesting that retailers can be heterogenous on different
attributes (Dawar and Parker 1994).
3 Although it is implicit in our empirical approach, we do not explicitly address the fact that reputation also builds
trust between traders (see, for instance, Resnick et al. (2000), Ba and Pavlou (2002), and Ba (2001)). This could be
done by analyzing the network structure of buyer-seller relationships, an interesting direction for further work.
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our techniques automatically identify the dimensions of reputation from unstructured text feedback,
and automatically understand the positive or negative semantic orientation of each evaluation,
together with the intensity of such evaluation. We are thus able to compare multiple dimensions of
reputation, provide evidence consistent with buyers valuing different dimensions differentially, and
predict future sales based on an analysis of seller reputation profiles, all of which move our paper’s
contribution substantially beyond existing work.
The techniques we use in this paper draw from research on opinion extraction, which has
attracted substantial recent interest in the computational linguistics community. For instance,
Hatzivassiloglou and McKeown (1997) use a supervised learning technique to identify the semantic
orientation of adjectives. Despite the high accuracy of the proposed technique, the requirement for
manual tagging of training data makes this technique prohibitively expensive in our setting. Turney
(2002) notes that the semantic orientation of an adjective depends on the noun that it modifies
(e.g. “unpredictable steering” for a car vs. “unpredictable plot” for a movie), and suggests using
adjective-noun or adverb-verb pairs to extract semantic orientation, an approach we follow. Turney
and Littman (2003) determine the semantic orientation of a word pair by computing the pairwise
mutual information between the word pair and a set of unambiguously positive words (e.g., good,
nice, excellent, positive, fortunate, correct, superior) and unambiguously negative words (e.g., bad,
nasty, poor, negative, unfortunate, wrong, inferior). To compute the pairwise mutual information
they issue queries to search engines for each evaluated word pair. Kamps and Marx (2002) use
WordNet (Fellbaum 1998) to measure the distance of each word from “good” and “bad.”. Hu and
Liu (2004), whose study is the closest to our work, use Wordnet to compute the semantic orien-
tation of product evaluations and try to summarize user reviews by extracting the positive and
negative evaluations of the different product features. Lee (2004) uses text mining in the context
of an ontology-based approach to analyzing product reviews. Our work is also related to recent
papers about word-of-mouth that relate content in product reviews to demand (e.g., Godes and
Mayzlin 2004, Senecal and Nantel 2004, Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) by looking at attributes such
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as the length of the review or newsgroup. Our work uses a significantly more sophisticated text
analysis methodology, allowing us to identify the nuances in the text that previous papers could
not capture.
While our text mining of reputation profiles is inspired by these previous studies about opinion
extraction and subjectivity analysis, it does differ in significant ways. First, we do not require any
external resources for evaluating the (positive or negative) orientation of a word. Using search
engines (e.g., Turney 2002, Turney and Littman 2003) is prohibitively expensive for large scale
evaluation. The use of a lexical resource such as Wordnet is problematic when the adjectives can
have different meanings that rely on their context (e.g., “fast shipping” vs. “fast packaging”).
Second, by using price premiums to score our word pairs, we have the first truly objective measure
of the positive or negative effect of the text in an evaluation. For example, on Amazon, the buyers
tend to use superlatives to give a positive evaluation (e.g., “great packaging” ), and therefore, simple
evaluations (e.g., “good packaging”) may actually have neutral or slightly negative connotation.
This is in contrast with all previous opinion extraction techniques that would have unambiguously
characterized “good packaging” as a positive evaluation.
3. Reputation and pricing power
This section develops our hypotheses, drawing on prior theory, past studies of reputation systems,
and an outline of an economics model (which is presented in Appendix A).
Buyers and sellers are separated by time and distance. Furthermore, the quality of a seller on
fulfilment characteristics a buyer may value is not known prior to transacting. Our underlying
model is of risk-averse buyers who choose a seller to maximize their expected surplus from trade.
All else being equal, these buyers are likely to choose sellers in a manner that lowers transaction
risk. The premium a seller can charge will therefore be related to the degree of risk associated with
a transaction. Sellers with lower numeric ratings and fewer completed transactions have less “infor-
mation” about them available to prospective buyers. Better average scores and a longer history also
assure buyers that sellers will not ”sacrifice” their reputation and renege (Klein and Leﬄer 1981,
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Klein 2000) and in this context, reputation systems can act as assurance mechanisms (Kalyanam
and McIntyre 2001). Risk averse buyers will therefore be inclined to buy at a price premium from
a seller with higher average ratings and more prior transactions.
Motivated by the risk induced by fulfilment quality uncertainty and separation in time /distance,
past research has conjectured that institutional feedback mechanisms facilitate trust on the Inter-
net (Ba and Pavlou 2002, Pavlou and Gefen 2005), and how ecommerce sites design trust-building
features by posting text (Kim and Benbasat 2003). Trust can be formed through familiarity (Gefen
et al. 2003). Transaction frequency can make a seller more familiar to a buyer, or to others known
to the buyer. Thus, prior work on reputation systems as methods for risk mitigation and trust
building lead to the same baseline hypotheses:
H1 Sellers with higher average numerical reputation scores will have higher price premiums
associated with their successful transactions.
H2 Sellers with a more experience will have higher price premiums associated with their suc-
cessful transactions.
Next, we turn to the multi-dimensionality of reputation. It seems quite natural to us that order
fulfilment has many dimensions. A couple of prior studies have explored this idea slightly. For
example, Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) postulate credibility and benevolence as two dimensions of
importance. If there are multiple fulfilment dimensions, it seems natural to conjecture that sellers
may have different capabilities across them. It also seems natural that these dimensions could be
valued, on average, differently, and will thus have varying effects on pricing power. Our basis for
defining and scoring these fulfilment dimensions is textual feedback structured and scored as word
pairs (bigrams) and categorized as positive or negative (more on this later). The next hypotheses
follow naturally.
H3a All else equal, sellers with a higher frequency of positive word pairs associated with a fulfil-
ment characteristic will have higher price premiums associated with their successful transactions.
H3b All else equal, sellers with a higher frequency of negative word pairs associated with a ful-
filment characteristic will have lower price premiums associated with their successful transactions.
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Based on what we know about decision making under risk from Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
and given that our buyers are risk averse, it seems possible that negative words will have a relatively
larger impact. We do not hypothesize this explicitly, but discuss it later.
Our final hypothesis is based on our model of buyers being heterogeneous in the relative impor-
tance they place on different fulfilment dimensions. If this is indeed the case, then the successful
completion of a transaction reveals a buyer’s preference for the dimensions that a seller is accom-
plished at. For example, suppose a seller scores high on delivery and low on customer service. If all
buyers placed the same weights on delivery and service, there would be no real revelation of pref-
erences in the fulfilled transactions. On the other hand, if some buyers weight delivery more highly
than customer service, and others weight customer service more than delivery, it is very likely that
a transaction fulfilled by the seller in question involves a buyer from the former set. The fact that
the seller’s distinguishing dimension is delivery will thus have additional explanatory power about
its price premium (that is, over and above what is explained by the premiums attached to delivery
on average. on a specific dimension.)
H4 All else equal, a higher score on a seller’s distinguishing characteristic leads to a higher price
premium.
4. Data and baseline results
Our data is of a cross-section of software resellers in several different categories gathered from
publicly available information on software product listings at Amazon.com. Data from Amazon has
many advantages for a study of our kind. Online feedback mechanisms rely on voluntary reporting
of privately observed outcomes. This introduces potential reporting bias since traders may exhibit
differing propensities to report different outcome types (Dellarocas and Wood 2006). On reputation
systems like the one at Half.com, for instance, this leads to potential feedback manipulation by
buyers and sellers, since buyers rate sellers, and sellers rate buyers, thus the truthfulness of reported
reputation is affected by the fear of retaliation. Dellarocas and Wood (2006) provide evidence of
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both positive and negative reciprocation among eBay traders. On Amazon.com, on the other hand,
sellers do not rate buyers. Consequently, reputations scores and feedback are more reliable.
The data are gathered using automated Java scripts which access XML pages downloaded
from the retailer. The panel includes 280 individual software titles, with an equal number of
products from each of five major categories: Business/Productivity, Graphics, Development, Secu-
rity/Utilities and Operating Systems. We gather data about all transactions for these software
titles over 180 days between October 2004 and March 2005. Our set of sellers includes both individ-
uals and Pro Merchants (who use Amazon’s retail platform commercially). For each transaction,
the variables associated with the seller and the product include the price at which the product
was sold,4 the ID of the seller, the seller’s reputation at the time of the transaction (more on this
later), the seller’s reported condition of the product, and the duration for which the product was
listed before it was sold. These conditions are coded in our dataset on a scale from 1 to 5, with
5 denoting the highest quality (New) and 1 denoting the lowest grade (Acceptable). Additionally,
we also have variables associated with the competing identical products available at the time the
product was sold.
We mine the XML feed every eight hours. We exploit the fact that Amazon.com associates a
unique transaction ID with each listing. This transaction ID enables us to distinguish between
multiple or successive listings of identical products sold by the same seller. When a transaction
ID associated with a particular listing is removed, we infer this to mean that the listed product
was successfully sold in the prior eight-hour window (Ghose et al. 2006).5 The unique transaction
4 While it is true that the posted prices are chosen by sellers, buyers have a choice of which seller to buy from. So, a
rational buyer would buy at a price that maximizes the buyer’s utility, and this is likely to be closer to their actual
valuation for the product.
5 Amazon indicates that their Pro Merchant seller listings remain on the site indefinitely until they are sold, while
products listed by individual sellers are removed from the site after 60 days. We saw no unusual rise in inferred sales
around the 60 day mark. Therefore, we include all inferred sales in our analysis regardless of the number of days
before a sale occurs. We also ran our estimates by removing all imputed sales that occur exactly 60 days after listing,
and this resulted in no appreciable change to our results. However, if the seller delists the product and then adds it
again as a separate listing then,that would lead to some noise in the data. But given that seller has to pay a listing
fee of $0.99 every time they list a product, it seems logical that they will simply change the prices without de-listing
and re-listing the product.
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Figure 1 A set of sellers on the secondary market of Amazon.com selling an identical product for different prices
ID associated with each new listing lets us infer if a transaction has occurred even if the seller
immediately lists another identical product for sale (while this listing would have the same seller
and product, it would have a new transaction ID). We have data about 9484 unique transactions,
along with reputation and pricing data for the successful seller and each of its competitors (defined
as sellers who had listed the same product on Amazon.com at the time of any transaction). The
“reputation” of a seller is constructed from its entire reputation history. Each of these sellers has
a feedback profile, which, as described earlier, consists of numerical scores and text-based buyer
feedback. The numerical ratings are provided on a scale of one to five stars. These ratings are
averaged to provide an overall score to the seller. Amazon also reports similar averages over the
last 30 days, 90 days and 365 days, for each of three categories: positive (4-5), neutral (3) and
negative (1-2). Some typical positive, neutral, and negative comments are displayed in Figure 2.
Again, we collect all feedback (both numerical and text-based) associated with a seller over
the entire lifetime of the seller, rather than simply over the 180-day period. This enables us to
reconstruct each seller’s exact feedback profile at the time each transaction. There were 1078 sellers,
with an average level of experience of 4,932 postings. Of these 1078 sellers, 122 of them successfully
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Figure 2 Fraction of the feedback profile for a seller, as displayed by Amazon
completed transactions in our 180-day period, while the remaining acted only as participants in
the market, without actually selling a (monitored) product.6
We have chosen software as our product category because of the uniformity in its product quality
across sellers (92% of our products were listed by the seller as “new”, and in general, software does
not “degrade” with use). This is important because it implies that price variation we observe can be
attributed primarily to variation in the seller’s performance on the fulfilment characteristics that
buyers value, and the expected quality that buyers infer about the sellers’ potential performance
based on the information contained in their feedback profiles. Second, many of the titles are pretty
valuable. Thus, problems with fulfilment are likely to have an economic impact on the buyer, so it
is reasonable to expect buyers to use seller feedback to infer reputation and pay a higher price for
it.
4.1. Baseline results: average reputation and experience
Our preliminary estimates focus on numeric feedback scores and ignore all text-based feedback
completely. Our dependent variable is PricePremium. We use two variants. The first is RegPri-
cePremium, the difference between the price at which the transaction occurred and the price of
each competing unsuccessful seller. This creates N −1 observations per transaction where N is the
6 These sellers may have conducted transactions on products outside our 280-product panel.
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total number of sellers. The second is AveragePricePremium, defined as the difference between the
price at which the transaction occurred, and the average prices of competing unsuccessful sellers.
This leads to one observation per transaction. If a seller with a higher average reputation or a
higher level of experience can charge a higher price we should observe higher price premiums for
this seller.
Our variables are summarized in Table 1, and their descriptive statistics in Table 2. The main
variables are:
• ProductPrice : the manufacturer’s price at which software was listed on Amazon, used to
control for the differences in the absolute values of the software products.
• Rating : the average value of the seller’s (SellerRating) and competitors’ (CompetitorRating)
numerical scores over their entire transaction history. DiffRating encodes the difference in ratings
and is equal to SellerRating-CompetitorRating.
• Product Condition : the average condition of the product as reported by the seller (Seller-
Condition) and competitor CompetitorCondition). As above, we also have DiffCondition that is
equal to SellerCondition-CompetitorCondition.
• Life : the total number of seller (SellerLife) and competitor transactions (Competitor-
Life), measuring their level of experience on Amazon.com; the DiffLife is equal to SellerLife-
CompetitorLife.7
• Competitors: the number of competitors for each transaction. Intuitively, more competitors
leads to more intense competition and lower price premiums.
We estimated models of the following form:
ln(RegPricePremium) = α+β1 ln(ProductPrice) +β2(RegDiffRating) + (1)
7 Note that depending on the regression, each of DiffRating, DiffLife and DiffCondition are coded in two ways.
For example, first, DiffLife is coded as the difference in the number of transactions between each seller and each
competitor. This variable is used as an independent variable when the dependent variable is Regular Price Premium.
In this case, for each transaction, there are N observations, where N is the number of competing sellers at time of
sale. Second, DiffLife is coded as the difference between the number of lifetime feedback evaluations received by the
seller and the AVERAGE of the lifetime feedback evaluations received by the competitors. This variable is used as
an independent variable when the dependent variable is Average Price Premium. In this case, for each transaction,
there is one observation.
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Variable Brief Description
RegPricePremium Difference between the sale price and
all of the competing prices.
AvgPricePremium Difference between the sale price and the average of
all competing prices.
ProductPrice List price of the new product as listed on Amazon.
SalePrice Price at which the used product was sold on Amazon.
RegDiffRating Difference between the numerical reputation score of
the seller and the reputation scores of all competitors at the time of sale.
RegDiffLife Difference between the number of transactions completed by
the seller and the number of transactions completed
by all the competitors at the time of sale.
RegDiffCondition Difference between the product condition reported by the seller and
that reported by all the other competitors at the time of sale.
AvgDiffRating Difference between the numerical reputation score of the seller and
the average of the reputation scores of all competitors at the time of sale.
AvgDiffLife Difference between the number of transactions completed by
the seller and the average of the number of transactions completed
by all the competitors at the time of sale.
AvgDiffCondition Difference between the product condition reported by the seller and the average
of the product condition of all the other competitors at the time of sale.
Competitors Total number of unique sellers for a given product listing.
Table 1 Descriptions of the numeric variables that we use in our econometric models (see Equations 1 and 2).
β3 ln(RegDiffLife) +β4(RegDiffCondition) +β5 ln(Competitors) +µ+ .
ln(AvgPricePremium) = α+β1 ln(ProductPrice) +β2(AvgDiffRating) + (2)
β3 ln(AvgDiffLife) +β4(AvgDiffCondition) +β5 ln(Competitors) +µ+ .
We use OLS regression with fixed effects controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across sellers
and products, as well as regressions with product, seller, and competitor fixed effects.8 Note that
our data is at the transaction level–that is the unit of observation is at the level of a product i sold
by a seller j when competing with other sellers, N, where N is the number of competing sellers
at the time of the transaction. Here µ denotes the fixed effect and  denotes the idiosyncratic
error term. Both regressions described above yielded qualitatively similar results, and we report
the results of both the sets, since they are both relevant for the text analysis that follows.9
8 We verified that the fixed-effects transformation was in fact more suitable than the random-effects transformation
using the Hausman test.
9 To normalize the distribution and minimize the effect of any outliers, we take the log of the ProductPrice, Pri-
cePremium, DiffLife and Competitors variables.
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The results of these estimations are presented in Tables 11 and 12. In both cases, these results
support our hypothesis 2: the differences in the level of reputation score between sellers and com-
petitors (DiffLife) has a positive and significant effect on pricing premiums, in Tables 11 and 12.
Notice that the average price premium changes much more rapidly with changes in average repu-
tation and experience than the price premium relative to one’s nearest competitor. The coefficient
of ln(ProductPrice) is less than 1 in each case, indicating that while the magnitude of the price
premium increases with product price, it decreases in percentage terms. The other coefficients can
be interpreted in a standard way: for instance, the coefficient of DiffCondition in Table 12 indicates
that a 1 point increase in the difference between the seller’s and competitor’s average product
condition increases the seller’s price premium by about 11%.
Surprisingly, while the coefficients on DiffRating are consistently significant, their signs are
mixed. Each of our regressions controls for seller and product fixed effects. When controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity across competitors with whom the pairwise comparison is made as well
(which is only possible when RegPricePremium is the dependent variable), a higher reputation is
associated with a higher price premium (table 11, column 2). However, in the absence of com-
petitor fixed effects, a higher reputation score is associated with a lower price premium (table
11 column 1 and table 12). One simple interpretation of this unusual finding is that differences
across competitors represented by information contained in their text feedback is important. When
there is a control for unobserved heterogeneity across competitors, this is partially accounted for
(note that since we have not yet used text in the estimates, this feedback is still “unobserved”). If
not, there may be information about fulfilment dimensions contained in a seller’s feedback that is
systematically causing a competitor to beat the seller despite a lower average rating.
The above argument is not the only one consistent with our findings (for example, there may be
a few powerful sellers with high reputation scores who are just not good at software transactions).
In any case, it adds to the body of mixed evidence relating average numerical reputation scores to
prices, and further motivates a deeper analysis of the different dimensions constituting a seller’s
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reputation. We turn to this task in the next section.10
5. Discovering and Analyzing the Dimensions of Reputation
In Section 5.1, we describe how we use linguistic analysis techniques to structure the textual
feedback and to discover the dimensions of reputation (e.g., “packaging”) mentioned in the text.
In Section 5.2, we show how we can estimate the effect of the evaluations (e.g., “cool packaging”)
that buyers post, and see how such evaluations affect the pricing power of the sellers.
5.1. Retrieving the Dimensions of Reputation
This section describes a novel text analysis technique we have developed to structure the textual
part of the feedback profiles. The goal of the technique is to discover the dimensions that contribute
to the reputation of each vendor, identify the weight of that contribution, and quantitatively value
the text-based feedback provided by buyers on each dimension (e.g., that “cool packaging” is way
cooler than “good packaging”).
Consider a seller was characterized by a vector of characteristics X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn), repre-
senting their ability on each of n fulfilment characteristics (see Appendix A for further details).
Our technique is based on the notion that each of these n characteristics (or dimensions) can be
expressed by a noun or a verb phrase chosen from the set of all text feedback, and that a seller is
evaluated on these n dimensions. For example, dimension 1 might be “shipping”, dimension 2 might
be “packaging” and so on. Further, in our model, each of these dimensions is assigned a numerical
score. Of course, when posting textual feedback, buyers do not assign explicit numeric scores to
each (or to any) dimension. Rather, they use modifiers (which are typically adjectives or adverbs)
to evaluate the seller along each of these dimensions (we describe how we assign numeric scores to
each modifier later in this section). Once we have identified the set of all dimensions that sellers
are identified along, we can then parse each of the actual feedback postings from our data set, asso-
ciate a modifier with each dimension, and represent this feedback set as an n-dimensional vector of
10 Note, that the low R-squared values in these regressions as well as in the subsequent regressions in Section 6
are expected because this is the “within” (differenced) fixed effect estimator. If we had estimated the fixed effects
instead of differencing them out, the measured R-squared would be much higher. However, this latter model is often
computationally intractable in our data(due to the large number of fixed effects to estimate).
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modifiers. To illustrate this, consider the following example: vector of modifiers. To illustrate this,
consider the following example:
Example 1. Suppose dimension 1 is “delivery,” dimension 2 is “packaging,” and dimension 3
is “service.” The feedback posting “I was impressed by the speedy delivery! Great service!” is then
encoded as φ1 = [speedy ,NULL, great ], while the posting “The item arrived in awful packaging, and
the delivery was slow” is encoded as φ2 = [slow ,awful ,NULL].
Let M= {NULL,µ1, ..., µM} be the set of modifiers and consider a seller si with p postings in
its reputation profile. We denote with µijk ∈M the modifier that appears in the j-th posting and
is used to assess the k-th reputation dimension. We then structure the merchant’s feedback as an
n× p matrix M(si) whose rows are the p encoded vectors of modifiers associated with the seller.
Briefly, our algorithm constructs M(si) as follows:
1. Retrieves the feedback postings associated with a seller.
2. Parses the postings to identify the dimensions across which the buyer evaluates a seller. For
this task, we use a part-of-speech (POS) tagger11, which parses each posting and identifies the
part-of-speech12 for each word. We keep the nouns, noun phrases, and verbal phrases as dimensions
of the seller. We eliminate from consideration all dimensions that appear in the profiles of less than
50 (out of the 1,078) merchants, since we cannot extract statistically meaningful results for such
sparse dimensions13.
3. Retrieves adjectives and adverbs that refer to the nouns and verbs extracted in Step 2. To
associate the adjectives and adverbs with the correct dimensions, we use a syntactic parser14. A
syntactic parser analyzes the linguistic structure of each sentence and identifies the relations15
11 We used the Stanford JavaNLP tagger.
12 The parts-of-speech are: verb, noun, pronoun, adjective, adverb, preposition, conjunction, and interjection.
13 The technique as described so far, considers words like “shipping” and “ delivery” as separate dimensions, although
they refer to the same “real-life” dimension of a seller. We discuss how we overcome this limitation in Section 5.3.
14 We used the “Collins HeadFinder” capability of the Stanford JavaNLP package.
15 The use of a syntactic parser allows us to identify adjective-noun and adverb-verb pairs, even if the two constituent
words are not placed next to each other.
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between the words. For our purposes, we keep the adjective-noun and adverb-verb pairs, which
will serve as the basis for our further analysis.
We have implemented this algorithm on the feedback postings of each of our sellers. This trans-
forms the set of all unstructured text feedback into a set of structured evaluations. Our analysis
yields 151 unique dimensions, and a total of 142 modifiers (note that there is overlap between the
modifier sets for each dimension). Tables 8 and 9 show a subset of the summary statistics for the
most frequent modifier-dimension pairs.
The real question, of course, is how to “understand” the meaning of these dimension-modifier
pairs and how to measure the effect of these comments on the pricing power of the merchants. We
discuss these issues next.
5.2. Scoring the dimensions of reputation
In order to assign a “value” to the text reputation profile, we have developed and implemented a
method for inferring the numerical scores that should be associated with each modifier, for each
simple dimension (the elements of the matrix M(i) as discussed earlier). These elements belong to
the (global) set of modifiers M. We aim to compute the “score” a(µ, j, k) that a modifier µ ∈M
assigns to dimension k, when it appears in the j-th posting.
Since buyers tend to read only the first few pages of text-based feedback, rather than all these
pages, recent text postings should influence a buyer’s assessment more heavily. We model this by
assuming that K is the number of postings that appear on each page (K = 25 on Amazon.com), and
that c is the probability of clicking on the “Next” link and moving to the next page of evaluations.16
Intuitively, we weight down the contribution of old postings in the overall reputation score, by
assuming that the user looks only at the first few pages of feedback postings and clicks “Next” i
times with probability ci. This assigns a posting-specific weight rj for the j-th posting:
rj =
cb jK c∑p
q=1 c
b qK c , (3)
16 We conducted experiments with the values c = 0.0, c = 0.25, c = 0.5, c = 0.75 and c = 1.0. The results across all
values of c were similar. For conciseness, we report in the rest of the paper only results for c= 0.5.
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where j is the rank of the posting, K is the number of postings per page, and p is the total number
of postings for the given seller. Next, we set:
a(µ, j, k) = rj · a(µ,k), (4)
where by a(µ,k) we denote the “global” score that the modifier µ assigns to dimension k.
Finally, we model buyers as placing different weights on each dimension of interest. Thus, each
buyer is characterized by a type vectors w, the weights that the buyer uses to compute a weighted
average of these modifier scores. The overall “reputation score” given by a buyer of type w to a
seller i whose feedback set has been converted to the matrix of modifiers M(i) = {µijk} is therefore:
Π(i) = rT .A(M(i)).w, (5)
where r = [r1, r2, ...rp] is the vector of the posting-specific weights. (See Equation 3.) Or more
explicitly:
Π(i) = [r1, r2, ...rp]
 a(µ
i
11,1) . . . a(µi1n, n)
...
. . .
...
a(µip1,1) . . . a(µipn, n)

w1...
wn
 . (6)
If we model the buyer’s type distribution F (w) as being independently distributed along each
dimension, each modifier score a(µ,k) is also an independent random variable, and the random
variable Π(i) is a sum of random variables. Specifically, we have:
Π(i) = (w1 · a(µ1,1)) ·R(µ1,1) + . . .+ (wn · a(µM , n)) ·R(µM , n) (7)
where R(µj, k) is equal to the sum of the ri weights in all the postings in which the modifier µj
modifies dimension k. From our data, we can easily compute the R(µj, k) values by simply counting
the times that each dimension-modifier pair appears and summing appropriately the rj values.
Interestingly, we do not have to estimate the distributions of wk ·a(µj, k); instead, we can just treat
wk ·a(µj, k) as part of the βi coefficient that a regression assigns to each regressor. In our case, the
regressors are the modifier-dimension pairs.
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We first treat each modifier-dimensionpair as a separate regressor . (We present an alternative
approach in Section 5.3.) Estimating equations similar to the ones described in Equation 1, after
adding the Π(·) variables for the seller and the competitor in the regression. This process yields
a weight associated with each modifier-dimension pair, which can be interpreted as an ordinal
measure of the “value” (or increase/decrease in pricing power) of having that pair associated with
a particular transaction. We discuss our findings in Section 6.2.
5.3. Clustering the Dimensions of Reputation
We observe that many simple dimensions refer to the same real-life fulfilment dimension. For
example, the pairs “never sent,” “never received”, “never delivered”, “not received”, “not shipped”,
and “not delivered” have the same meaning and represent only one dimension (delivery). Ideally,
we would like these (separate) dimensions to appear as a single independent variable.
We first attempted to apply one of many clustering techniques used to group together different
verbs and nouns that correspond to the same dimension. We have experimented with Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al. 2003), Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) (Lee and
Seung 1999), and probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (pLSI) (Hofmann 1999). These represent
the state-of-the-art machine learning techniques for clustering. Unfortunately, such techniques did
not work well in setting: the underlying assumption for all these techniques is that nouns and
verbs that refer to the same real-life dimension will appear frequently together. Buyer feedback
exhibits exactly the opposite pattern, though: once buyers discuss one aspect of the transaction
(e.g., shipping) they typically start discussing another dimension (e.g., packaging), not surprising
given the limited amount of space available for the posting.
Given the difficulty of using automatic clustering techniques, we used a semi-automatic approach.
We first derived the most important dimension-modifier pairs using our text mining techniques,
ranked by frequency. We then manually assigned the top-500 most frequent pairs to categories. We
first identified the eight different fulfilment dimensions by examining the list of modifier-dimension
pairs. (This outcome is further supported by the results of an independent annotation study,
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described in Section 6.1.) Then, we classified each modifier-dimension pair as positive, neutral or
negative. This leads to a fulfillment characteristics vector for each seller, which has 3n components,
where n is the total number of dimensions.17 We compute the scores for each (clustered) dimension
in the same way that we did in Section 5.2 for the individual modifier-dimension pairs. We discuss
our findings in Section 6.2.
6. Experimental Results
In this section, we discuss our findings, and describe the results of some robustness checks. We
first report the results of our content analysis study that verify the high recall of our text mining
technique (Section 6.1). Then, we present results that measure the importance of each dimension
of reputation (Section 6.2). Finally, we describe the predictive power of text evaluations, and their
use in a predictive model to determine future market outcomes. (Section 6.3). We conclude with a
discussion of how the different dimensions of reputation affect the pricing power of online merchants
(Section 6.4).
6.1. Recall of Extraction
Our first experimental evaluation step examines whether the opinion extraction technique of Sec-
tion 5.1 indeed captures all the reputation characteristics expressed in the feedback (recall) and
whether the dimensions that we capture are accurate (precision). For recall, we used two human
annotators. The annotators read a random sample of 1,000 feedback postings, and identified the rep-
utation dimensions mentioned in the text. Then, they examined the extracted modifier-dimension
pairs for each posting and marked whether the modifier-dimension pairs captured the identified
real reputation dimensions mentioned in the posting and which pairs were spurious, non-opinion
phrases.
Both annotators identified nine reputation dimensions (see Table 16). Since the annotators did
not agree in all annotations, we computed the average human recall hRecd =
agreedd
alld
for each dimen-
sion d, where agreedd is the number of postings for which both annotators identified the reputation
17 n= 8, although we end up with 21 and not 3 · 8 = 24 dimensions, because our data does not contain neutral pairs
for three dimensions.
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dimension d, and alld is the number of postings in which at least one annotator identified the
dimension d. Based on the annotations, we computed the recall of our algorithm against each anno-
tator. We report the average recall for each dimension, together with the human recall in Table 16.
The recall of our technique is only slightly inferior to the performance of humans, indicating that
the technique of Section 5.1 extracts the majority of the posted evaluations.18
Interestingly, precision is not an issue in our setting. In our framework, if an particular modifier-
dimension pair is just noise, then it is unlikely to have a statistically significant correlation with
price premium. Put differently, the noisy opinion phrases are statistically guaranteed to be filtered
out by the regression.
6.2. The Effect of Text Evaluations
In this section, we discuss our findings about the importance and the effect of text evaluations on
the price premiums that merchants can charge. We also show that typically there is one differen-
tiating dimension of reputation that explains a disproportionate variation in price premium. This
is consistent with our model of heterogeneous buyers, and evidence that the merchants can treat
the most important dimension of their reputation as a differentiating characteristic.
Effect of individual phrases: Tables 13, 14 and 15 summarize the dimension-modifier pairs
(positive and negative) that were statistically significant across all regressions. A weight of zero
means that the modifier-dimension pair has no effect on the seller’s pricing power, a weight above
zero means that it has a positive impact, and a weight lower than zero means that it has a
negative impact on the seller’s (positive) price premium. Recall that these reflect changes in the
seller’s average pricing power across products after taking their average numerical score and level
of experience into account, and highlight the importance of the value contained in text-based
reputation.19 Note also that the coefficients reveal characteristics of the reputation market that
18 In the case of “Item Description,” where the computer recall was higher than the human recall, our technique
identified almost all the phrases of one annotator, but the other annotator had a more liberal interpretation of “Item
Description” dimension and annotated significantly more postings with the dimension “Item Description” than the
other annotator, thus decreasing the human recall.
19 We checked the correlation matrix of the independent variables. Due to the huge number of independent variables,
we are unable to report the correlation matrix. However, our analysis revealed that there is very little correlation
between the modifier-dimension variables, with less than 1% of the pairs having a correlation higher than 0.2.
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cannot be normally captured by existing opinion mining systems. For example, on Amazon, the
buyers tend to use superlatives to give a positive evaluation (e.g., “great packaging” ), and therefore,
simple evaluations (e.g., “good packaging”) actually have slightly negative effect. This is in contrast
with all previous opinion extraction techniques that would have unambiguously characterized “good
packaging” as a positive evaluation.
Effect of clustered dimensions: We create the DiffDimension variable where DiffDimension
is the difference between the seller and the competitor’s score on a given (clustered) dimension.
Therefore, each DiffDimension (positive, neutral or negative) is a separate independent variable in
our model. We estimate equations similar to those in Equation 1, adding these clustered dimension
variables. Furthermore, before computing the difference, we normalized the reputation scores for
each transaction, giving a score of 1 to the merchant with the highest score in this dimension and a
score of 0 to the merchant with the lower score. This normalization allows us to compare the scores
across different dimensions without the need to consult summary statistics for each variable. This
process yields a weight associated with each dimension, which can be interpreted as an ordinal
measure of the “value” (or increase/decrease in pricing power) of having that pair associated with
a particular transaction.
The analysis with these 21 dimensions is presented in Table 19. We show that negative ratings on
some topics matter more than positive or neutral ratings. As before, these estimates reflect changes
in the seller’s average pricing power across products after taking their average numerical score
and level of experience into account, and highlight the importance of the value contained in text-
based reputation.20 We present further discussion on the importance of the different dimensions of
reputation in Section 6.4.
Buyer heterogeneity and the distinguishing dimension of reputation: The last hypoth-
esis (H4) from Section 3 states that “All else equal, a higher score on a seller’s distinguishing
20 Regressions involving the average price premium as the dependent variable yield similar results, and are omitted
for brevity. Further, our results are qualitatively robust to different values of c. We checked the correlation matrix
and found that 94% of the variable pairs had a correlation below 0.3. We also performed tests for multi-collinearity
such as the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) test. Our analysis reveals that multi-collinearity was not a significant
concern in our dataset.
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characteristic leads to a higher price premium.” In order to test this hypothesis, we created a set
of dummies, Dummy i that are equal to 1 when the respective dimension
has the highest score across the positive, neutral, and negative (clustered) dimensions. For exam-
ple, if positive delivery is the best dimension for a seller, then the respective dummy for this
seller will be equal to 1 for this variable, while all the other 20 variables will be 0. Thereafter,
we constructed three new variables from the 21 dimensions and the respective dummy variables
that represent which of the dimensions has the maximum score for a given seller. These three new
variables are:
∑
PositiveDimensioni ·Dummy i, where i ∈ (1,8)
∑
NeutralDimensionj ·Dummyj,
where j ∈ (9,13) and∑NegativeDimensionk ·Dummyk, where k ∈ (14,21). Recall that in any given
transaction, only one of the 21 dummy variables can be equal to 1. Estimating an equation with
the above additional independent variables helps us evaluate our last hypothesis that sellers can
be identified by a single distinguishing characteristic, and that an increase in the score of that
dimension increases pricing power.
The estimates from this analysis are presented in Table 20. In column (1), we present the esti-
mates from running the regressions on the sample where c is equal to 0.0.21 The main coefficients
of interest in this Table are
∑
PositiveDimensioni ·Dummyi,
∑
NeutralDimensionj ∗Dummyj and∑
NegativeDimensionk ·Dummyk.
We find that the coefficient of
∑
PositiveDimensioni ·Dummyi is positive and significant, while
the coefficients of
∑
NeutralDimensionj ∗Dummyj and
∑
NegativeDimensionk ·Dummyk are not
significant. This supports our hypotheses of the distinguishing dimension, and suggests that con-
sistent with our conjecture, different buyers do place a different weight on different dimensions.
As a robustness check, in column (2) we present the estimates from running the regressions on
the sample where c is equal to 0.25. We find that all three coefficients are significant, and in the
expected direction. However, the coefficient of
∑
PositiveDimensionk ·Dummyk is larger in mag-
nitude than
∑
NegativeDimensionk ·Dummyk, which provides further support for our hypothesis
21 Recall that c is the probability with which a consumer clicks on the next page of the seller’s feedback profile. We
also ran regressions for other values of c, and found that our results are qualitatively very similar.
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4. These results underline the importance of treating reputation as multidimensional rather than a
single numerical score; buyers are heterogeneous in what they consider important, and sellers can
differentiate themselves on either the dimension they see as mattering the most, or on what they
consider themselves most accomplished at.
6.3. Predicting Market Outcomes Using Text Postings
A natural next step is to see if we could achieve similar results using just the reputation charac-
teristics captured by the numeric variables that appear in each merchant’s reputation profile. We
do have evidence that text contains additional information since our R2 values with the additional
text-extracted and clustered dimensions are higher.
To strengthen this further, we train a predictive model to predict which of a set of competing
sellers will make a sale. Such a prediction can be based on the posted prices and on the numeric
and text reputation of each merchant. We used a decision tree classifier, specifically the C4.5
classifier Quinlan (1992). Our choice of using decision trees was motivated by the ability of decision
trees to capture non-linear interactions of textual and numeric data. The goal of our classifier is
to take as input a pair of merchants and then decide which of the two will make a sale.
For the classifier generation, the training set is the transactions that took place in the first
four months and the test set is the transactions in the last two months of our data set. Table 17
summarizes the results for different sets of features used. The 55% accuracy when using only prices
as features indicates that customers rarely choose a product based solely on price. Rather, as
indicated by the 74% accuracy, they also consider the reputation of the merchants as expressed
in the numeric scores in the reputation profile. The question is, of course, if customers consider
the text of the postings. We observed that the prediction accuracy in the test set increases to
87%-89% when using the textual reputation variables. In fact, accuracy decreased only slightly
(from 89% to 87%) when we removed the numeric variables from the input, as indicated by the
results in Table 17. This is compelling and further evidence that the text information can capture
the information in the numeric variables, but not vice versa.
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6.4. Further Discussion of our Experimental Findings
Overall, we observed that there are a small number of “real-life” dimensions of reputation matter
to the buyers. However, customers place different emphasis on different aspects of reputation and
react differently to positive or negative comments across each dimension.
• Problem Response (Misc): Price premiums go down when a merchant is evaluated on
miscellaneous problem responses. Interestingly, even when buyers provide positive evaluations on
this dimension, price premiums decrease. Although this seems counterintuitive, it could indicate
that buyers prefer a problem-free transaction, and any comments (even positive) about problems
can affect a transaction adversely.
• Customer Service: This is an important dimension, associated with significant variation in
price premiums. Notice that price premiums are affected significantly by simple modifier-dimensions
such as “superb service”, “quick service” or “happy service.” Further, the coefficients in Table 19,
we can also see that customers pay substantially more attention to negative comments about
customer service. This is consistent with an electronic market environment where buyers and
sellers are separated by time and distance. In contrast, buyers reward good customer service with
comparatively smaller price premiums.
• Packaging: All transactions involve shipping, and it is not surprising that buyers pay atten-
tion to the packaging of the product. In our data we observed a statistical significant effect only
on positive individual modifier-pairs on packaging (e.g., for comments like “great packaging,” or
“perfectly packaged”); we did not observe a statistically meaningful decrease when the comments
on packaging were negative. A surprising result was the positive coefficient for the negative packag-
ing dimension in Table 19: we attribute this result to the relative low importance of packaging for
software products, and to possible noise introduced by the manual dimension clustering process.
We should mention that the frequency of negative comments on packaging were comparatively rare
in our data.
• Delivery: The reputation for consistent, fast and seamless delivery of a product considerably
Ghose, Ipeirotis, and Sundararajan: The Dimensions of Reputation in Electronic Markets
28 Working Paper CeDER-06-02, New York University
increases the overall pricing power of a seller. Not surprisingly, both, the extent of order fulfillment
and the speed at which it is executed, matter in such transactions. In contrast, problems with the
shipping, such as items being sent to the wrong address or even instances of outright fraud such as
products that never arrived or were received, are a major source of frustration. Our results show
that comments about reneging such as “never delivered” or “ not shipped” significantly hurt the
price premium achievable by a seller over its competitors in future transactions.
• Product-specific Comments: In general, we observed that product-specific comments tend
to decrease price premiums. Given that the act of describing a product appropriately by the seller
on an electronic market constitutes an implicit guarantee for the buyer, any deviation from the
promised description is tantamount to product misrepresentation and constitutes a violation of
trust. Positive feedback postings on this dimension like “ just advertised” improve the ability of a
seller to charge higher prices in the future. When this is not the case (for example, when a buyer
receive a “wrong CD” or “wrong game” or “wrong book”), the respective negative postings decrease
the pricing premiums. This highlights the importance of representation in electronic markets.
• Overall: A large fraction of the feedback postings commented on the overall quality of the
transaction and on the overall sentiment towards the seller: not surprisingly, positive comments
(e.g., “awesome transaction” or “totally satisfied”) improve pricing power. Our results also show
that comments like “very recommended”, “A +++ seller” or “very impressive” affect price pre-
miums, but the magnitude of the increase is relatively modest. More importantly, we observe that
negative “overall” comments, although infrequent, decrease pricing power substantially. Comparing
the magnitudes of positive and negative comments along this dimension, we observe that negative
comments are almost five times more important than the positive ones.
using completely automated techniques for assessing the content of textual feedback, without
the need for expensive, manual inspection of the comments left by the buyers.
We believe that our technique can be successfully deployed over existing reputation mechanisms,
thereby significantly improving their impact. Since most reputation mechanisms rely on voluntary
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reporting of transaction outcomes, buyers do not leave feedback on every transaction.22 An under-
standing of the different dimensions of reputation might actually provide stronger incentives for
more buyers to leave feedback.23 We discuss the managerial implications of our results further in
what follows.
7. Contributions and Managerial Implications
Our paper develops and implements a new framework for identifying the dimensions of a seller’s
reputation that online buyers actually value. Textual comments from buyers are important cues
for improving the quality of electronic commerce. The study of the text feedback allows us to
automatically identify the dimensions of reputation that are important. Our study is the first to
examine the effect that positive and negative comments have across each dimension. Furthermore,
we can now infer the actual economic value of each feedback posting (for instance, see Table 21, page
49). As documented in Section 6.4, page 26, positive and negative opinions have a different effect
when evaluating a different dimension. By itself, this analysis sheds light on contradicting results
from previous studies, where positive feedback seems more important than negative in some cases,
and vice versa in others. We have shown that the relative importance of each is dimension-specific.
We present and experimentally confirm a new hypothesis: the dimension that differentiates a
seller, or the fulfillment characteristics on which the seller’s performance relative to its competitors
is highest independently explains variation in pricing power, even after accounting for average
differences in scores across the dimensions. In other words, we present evidence that customers look
for a specific reputation characteristic when buying from a given seller, and they are not uniform in
the importance they place on each of the dimensions of reputation. This is consistent with a natural
economic theory that posits buyer heterogeneity. It is also of managerial significance because it
provides a basis for understanding the extent to which a seller can benefit from improving on its
distinguishing dimension, or from choosing a different positioning.
22 Indeed, Zeckhauser and Resnick (2002) report that about 50% of eBay transactions in their data set were rated,
whereas Dellarocas et al. (2004) report a higher, between 50-70% response rate.
23 Amazon.com has recently adopted some elements of this strategy, asking users to evaluate merchants on specific
dimensions (delivery, item representation, and customer service).
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Figure 3 A snapshot of the buyer tool.
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As the number of professional merchants who sell using retailing platforms like that of Ama-
zon.com increases, our research insights become increasingly relevant. We rely on automated text-
mining techniques which require minimal manual user effort to operationalize. The outcome of our
techniques can also thus be more easily interpreted and acted upon. Our findings are also relevant
to a platform like Amazon or eBay in informing their design of a more effective online reputation
system. In particular, marketplace tools nased on the methods described in this paper are currently
under preliminary development, and have attracted commercial interest, as illustrated below.
• Buyers’ tool: More specifically, our techniques and results make it possible to build a tool
which allows buyers to efficiently search the electronic market for sellers that satisfy particular
criteria on each fulfilment dimension. For example, a buyer who wants to buy expensive electronic
equipment might be looking for sellers with excellent scores in the packaging dimension, even if
they are not that fast on shipping. This kind of system can substantially improve the efficiency
of electronic markets and the accessibility of the reputation feedback. It will enhance buyer
confidence that their opinion is important and is taken into account by other customers. This
will make reputation systems more prominent parts of current electronic marketplaces.
• Sellers’ tool: Our research also makes a tool that lets sellers assess the value of their own
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Figure 4 A snapshot of the seller tool.
RSI Pricing Tool for Sellers 
Canon Powershot x300
Seller: uCameraSite.com
Seller 1 - $431
Your competitive landscape
Product Price   (reputation)
(4.8)
1. Canon Powershot x300
Your last 5 transactions in Cameras
Name of product Price
Seller 2 - $409
You - $399
Seller 3 $382
(4.65)
(4.7)
(3 9)
$20
2. Kodak - EasyShare 5.0MP 
3. Nikon - Coolpix 5.1MP 
4. Fuji FinePix 5.1
5. Canon PowerShot x900
-
Seller 4-$379
Seller 5-$376
.
(3.6)
(3.4)
Your Price: $399
Your Reputation Price: $419 Left on the table
Your Reputation Premium: $20 (5%)                                             
Figure 5 A snapshot of the seller tool.
RSI Tool for Seller Reputation Management
Quantitatively Understand & Manage Seller Reputation
9%
How your customers see you 
relative to other sellers:
S i
Dimensions of your reputation and the 
relative importance to your customers:
Delivery
25%35%*
69%
89%
erv ce
Packaging
Delivery
Service
14%45%
82%
95%
Overall
Quality PackagingQuality
Other
* Percentile of all merchants
7%
• RSI Products Automatically Identify the Dimensions of Reputation from Textual Feedback
Dimensions a e Q antified Relati e to Othe  Selle s and Relati e to B e  Impo tance• r u v r r v uy r r
• Sellers can Understand their Key Dimensions of Reputation and Manage them over Time
• Arms Sellers with Vital Info to Compete on Reputation Dimensions other than Low Price.
reputation across each dimension viable, towards potentially comparing their reputation with
that of their competitors. Such a tool can have two goals, one tactical and one strategic. The
tactical goal is to allow sellers to price their products accurately, so that the posted prices
incorporate the value of their reputation, compared to the one of the competitors. The tool,
using the classifier described in Section 6.3, can increase confidence that a seller might make
a sale at the right price point. A broader strategic purpose is to enable sellers to assess their
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relative competitive advantages and disadvantages ion the different dimensions of reputation. By
realizing that customers look for a specific reputation characteristic when buying from a given
seller, sellers can focus on improving their performance on their best dimensions, or decide to
grow on another dimension of reputation that they deem is more profitable.
The relevance of these findings is not restricted to sellers on ecommerce platforms rather, they
may generalize to adding to our understanding of what dimensions of transactions buyers value
in electronic commerce in general. In this regard, our findings are of value to any business which
seeks a deeper understanding of what differentiates online commerce from its traditional bricks
and mortar counterpart.
8. Concluding remarks
We have presented a new approach for identifying and quantifying the dimensions of value from
online reputation. We characterize how both numerical and qualitative measures of reputation
affect a seller’s pricing power in a mediated electronic market. We have validated the predictions
of this theory by combining the results of the estimation of an econometric model with a novel text
analysis technique, contrasted the relative importance of positive and negative reputation, provided
new evidence of buyers valuing different fulfilment dimensions non-uniformly, and demonstrated
the predictive power of text feedback by using it in a sales prediction model. To the best of our
knowledge, this represents the first study of this kind, and the first set of results that establishes in
multiple ways the value of information contained in the text-based feedback of an online reputation
system.
Our analysis of the information in qualitative text feedback is likely to gain importance as the
fraction of used good exchanges taking place on trading networks that are not mediated by a central
market maker increases. As these networks evolve toward being the platform for more complex
trade, rather than just for the free exchange of files, online reputation takes on an increasingly
important role in these decentralized trading environments. A similar evolution occurred on Usenet
groups in the 1990’s, many of which were used as electronic secondary markets, and which, in
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the absence of a central mediating authority, used purely text-based feedback as their reputation
mechanism.
Our study suggests several directions for further research. First, it may be beneficial to modify
the method by which the “weights” associated with the dimensions of text-based feedback are
estimated, toward being able to associate a dollar value with each modifier-dimension pair. A
second extension could identify and account for patterns of manipulation of online reputation based
on analysis of the associated text. Due to non-reciprocity based reputation system, the possibility
of such systematic evidence of such manipulation on Amazon is low. However, it may well show
up in a larger dataset, or from a market that uses a trading mechanism where there is reciprocity
in the feedback system (for example, eBay allows both buyers and sellers to rate each other after
the completion of a transaction).
We study software sales. It is also worth conducting a similar study on data from a different
set of products to analyze if buyer behavior varies across different product categories. Following
work done in the context of shopbots (for example, Montgomery et al. (2004)), another extension
might develop economic measures of how of seller characteristics are evaluated from a consumer’s
perspective. The website interface of Amazon’s secondary market has parallels with a shopbot
system in which multiple goods from different sellers and different categories are displayed in
response to a single query from a prospective buyer. The development of this feature followed our
paper (although we do not have direct evidence that it was on account of our research).
An interesting extension to our approach would be to identify variation in trader trust based on
an analysis of the content of the text feedback; however, this is not something we pursue in this
paper. Finally, our study has not yet exploited the information contained in the structure of the
buyer-seller network. Observing how feedback from buyer-seller pairs evolves over time may yield
information that enables buyers to better “benchmark” the feedback. Specific buyers may prove to
be reliable “indicators” of specific categories of trade (or, in the terminology of Kleinberg (1999),
they may become “hubs”). This represents an exciting path for further research.
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Appendix A: Reputation and pricing power: A theoretical framework
We model an electronic marketplace in which m competing sellers offer a single product. There are M buyers
of this product, which, in addition to the product, they also value n different fulfillment characteristics for
the transaction. Examples of these characteristics might be speed of delivery, quality of packaging, post-sale
support and so on.
Each seller is indexed by a characteristics vector X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn), where Xi represents the seller’s
ability to provide the i-th dimension of fulfillment. We assume that the products sold by each seller are of
identical quality (which is consistent with our data set comprising consumer software, though adding an
extra characteristic x0 to represent product quality would not affect our results).
Buyers differ in the extent to which they place importance on each of these characteristics, and each buyer
is therefore indexed by a type vector w= (w1,w2, ...,wn), where a higher value of wi indicates that the buyer
places a relatively higher value on fulfillment characteristic i. Each buyer’s type is drawn from a common
distribution with distribution function F (w).
When a buyer purchases a product from a seller, there is a realized value of fulfillment z = (z1, z2, ..., zn)∈Z
(the quality of fulfillment provided by the seller on that specific transaction). If the price charged by the
seller is p, the value that the buyer gets from this transaction is:
u(w,z)− p, (8)
where u(w,z) is increasing in each component of its arguments. For example, u(w,z) might be a weighted
average of the realized fulfillment values.
After each transaction, the buyer posts a feedback set which contains the seller’s ID, the buyer’s ID,
and information about the fulfillment on that transaction. There is consequently a feedback set t(k) =
{s(k), b(k), φ(k)} associated with each transaction k, where the value of s(k) identifies the seller, the value of
b(k) identifies the buyer, and φ(k) contains information about the quality of fulfillment. In most reputation
systems, φ(k) contains a numerical score rating the overall quality of the transaction, along with unstructured
text describing some of the dimensions of the transaction. We model φ(k) as a vector containing an average
numerical score φ(k,0) and a score φ(i, k) corresponding to each fulfilment characteristic i.
Prior to a transaction, a buyer may observe the entire set of feedback {t(k)} for the electronic market. For
any seller j, the buyer can thus identify the feedback profile
T (j) = {t(k) : s(k) = j}, (9)
Denote the set of all such sets as T . Buyers map this profile T (j) to an expected fulfilment characteristics
vector using a common mapping Γ : T →Z. We define a seller i as having a better reputation than seller j if
E[u(w,Γ(T (i))]≥E[u(w,Γ(T (j))], (10)
where the expectation is taken over the w according to the distribution of buyer types F (w). Seller i could
thus have a better reputation for one or more of the following reasons:
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1. Seller i has a better average numerical reputation score than seller j.
2. The scores assigned to seller i on any one of the fulfilment characteristics are higher than those assigned
to seller j.
3. The scores assigned to seller i on the set of fulfilment characteristics that most buyers care about are
higher than those assigned to seller j.
4. T (i) is a larger set than T (j), and the estimate of average reputation generated by the mapping Γ
reflects risk aversion among potential buyers.
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Appendix B: Tables with Results and Robustness Checks
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Avg PricePremium 9484 10.57 80.550 .006 648.12
Reg PricePremium 107922 8.87 104.272 -2190 1016.34
Product Price 107922 191.85 238.460 17.99 1699.99
Sale Price 107922 203.32 241.67 0.99 2200
Seller Rating 107922 4.43 0.35 1 5
Seller Life 107922 5040.68 34183.64 1 277309
Seller Condition 107922 4.89 0.40 1 5
Competitor Price 107922 194.44 222.32 1.25 1909.5
Competitor Rating 107922 4.45 0.16 1 5
Competitor Life 107922 22323.6 23242.2 1 275900
Competitor Condition 107922 4.88 0.135 2 5
Number of Competitors 107922 14.37 6.56 1 34
Table 2 Summary statistics of numeric variables
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
AvgPricePremium 2850 8.782418 64.17632 -1012.15 512.34
RegPricePremium 36707 5.60369 92.30909 -2091.02 1016.34
Product Price 36707 168.1202 196.0477 0 1079.99
Sale Price 36707 170.8201 166.7746 4.98 1115.98
Seller Condition 36707 4.879778 .4388896 1 5
Seller Rating 36707 4.447053 .3559633 1 5
Seller Life 36707 4649.975 32344.57 1 269502
Competitors Price 36707 165.2152 159.3986 5 2190
Competitor Rating 36707 4.448226 .5223408 1 5
Competitor Life 36707 17246.41 54566.9 1 277311
Competitor Condition 36707 4.898085 .3246085 1 5
Competitors 36707 15.416 6.421855 1 34
Table 3 Summary statistics of numeric variables for Category 1 (Business and Productivity)
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
AvgPricePremium 1683 13.36933 119.163 -655.7 464.59
RegPricePremium 17766 16.96234 165.0254 -946.18 779.89
Product Price 17766 364.0664 318.996 39.99 1499.99
Sale Price 17766 418.1018 339.6169 8.94 1944.18
Seller Condition 17766 4.919284 .3512876 1 5
Seller Rating 17766 4.354838 .3295088 1 5
Seller Life 17766 5620.205 35852.08 1 277309
Competitor Price 17766 401.1381 325.6468 8.94 1944.18
Competitor Rating 17766 4.373755 .5181269 1 5
Competitor Life 17766 23721.83 64063.19 1 277307
Competitor condition 17766 4.904086 .3367502 1 5
Competitors 17766 12.27789 5.503406 1 28
Table 4 Summary statistics of numeric variables Category 2 (Graphics)
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Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
AvgPricePremium 978 12.57742 30.13679 -78.49 127.5
RegPricePremium 10629 7.970027 35.2827 -231.85 211.03
Product Price 10629 103.6505 300.7201 29.99 1679
Sale Price 10629 113.4063 301.9741 .23 1698.98
Seller Condition 10629 4.895098 .366302 1 5
Seller Rating 10629 4.442477 .3486588 1 5
Seller Life 10629 5452.536 35935.64 1 274578
Competitor Price 10629 105.4356 294.2604 .15 1829.34
Competitor Rating 10629 4.479928 .5417333 1 5
Competitor Condition 10629 4.849939 .4041156 1 5
Competitor Life 10629 20722.8 62116.01 1 277312
Competitors 10629 14.4404 5.960315 1 23
Table 5 Summary statistics of numeric variables Category 3 (Utilities and Security)
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
AvgPricePremium 1892 13.88572 85.16937 -469.57 301.94
RegPricePremium 18560 9.781514 113.176 -531.89 531.89
Product Price 18560 221.7273 136.4061 91.99 599.99
Sale Price 18560 196.3616 135.3116 32.99 651.4
Seller Condition 18560 4.887128 .4187991 1 5
Seller Rating 18560 4.466811 .4226316 1 5
Seller Life 18560 4386.464 31691.68 1 269495
Competitor Price 18560 186.5796 121.5053 33.29 651.4
Competitor Rating 18560 4.490453 .4977473 1 5
Competitor Condition 18560 4.869105 .4063752 1 5
Competitor Life 18560 21983.1 62147.07 1 277306
Competitors 18560 16.34229 5.388391 1 27
Table 6 Summary statistics of numeric variables Category 4(Development)
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
AvgPricePremium 2101 11.15895 74.57983 -509.17 256.21
RegPricePremium 24260 9.242575 79.33625 -654.58 666.71
Product Price 24260 140.5953 170.3248 29.99 799.99
Sale Price 24260 152.6693 171.428 1.49 857.97
Seller Condition 24260 4.92939 .3317591 1 5
Seller Rating 24260 4.440655 .3258944 1.4 5
Seller Life 24260 4835.397 34017.11 1 277306
Competitor Price 24260 143.4254 161.4424 1.49 858.9
Competitor Rating 24260 4.464386 .4947219 1 5
Competitor Condition 24260 4.893116 .3582716 1 5
Competitor Life 24260 26536.48 69031.27 1 277312
Competitors 24260 14.83937 7.361648 1 31
Table 7 Summary statistics of numeric variables Category 5 (Operating Systems)
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
never sent 107922 0.0000658 0.0022875 - 0.0526316 0.0526316
very recommended 107922 - 0.0001903 0.0022041 - 0.0769231 0.0213049
never received 107922 - 0.0001495 0.0114964 - 0.25 0.25
never delivered 107922 - 0.0000926 0.0016085 - 0.0625 0.0666667
always excellent 107922 - 0.0000394 0.0008319 - 0.024 4.77e-09
never responded 107922 - 0.0000469 0.0041165 - 0.1666667 0.1666667
great buying 107922 - 0.0001057 0.0028721 - 0.0769231 0.0769231
super transaction 107922 - 0.0000656 0.0014872 - 0.0714286 0.0714286
great person 107922 - 0.0000858 0.0015508 - 0.0833333 0.0588235
never heard 107922 - 0.000176 0.0016118 - 0.03 0.04
not received 107922 0.0000864 0.0034954 - 0.0555556 0.0526316
excellent communications 107922 - 0.000075 0.001125 - 0.0233918 0.0233918
terrific condition 107922 -9.79e-07 0.0000511 - 0.005 0.0012508
not have 107922 - 0.0022077 0.0224192 - 0.6666667 0.5
not received 107922 0.000173 0.0053725 - 0.1 0.1
cancelled order 107922 - 0.0005719 0.0100573 - 0.3333333 0.0200049
definitely recommend 107922 - 0.0003166 0.0042976 - 0.1666667 0.0338983
not notified 107922 - 0.0000279 0.0007656 - 0.02 0.0026596
excellent seller 107922 0.0081056 0.0380053 -1 1
not delivered 107922 5.15e-06 0.0030023 - 0.1666667 0.1666667
not shipped 107922 - 0.0005664 0.0031205 - 0.0625 0.0625
poor condition 107922 - 0.0000625 0.0019898 - 0.0344828 0.0344828
fast seller 107922 0.0003116 0.0046761 - 0.0666667 0.0666667
not ordered 107922 - 0.0000805 0.0033164 - 0.1428571 0.1428571
perfectly packaged 107922 0.0004791 0.0040951 - 0.0350877 0.0264901
bad experience 107922 - 0.0002027 0.0019415 - 0.04 0.02
A+++ seller 107922 - 0.0001791 0.0028428 - 0.047619 0.04
wrong CD 107922 0.0000111 0.0005755 - 0.0205392 0.02
wrong address 107922 - 0.00027 0.0034527 - 0.0769231 0.0769231
wrong book 107922 - 0.0000628 0.0031658 - 0.3333333 0.0555556
wrong game 107922 - 0.0000296 0.0014374 - 0.0666667 0.0666667
awesome transaction 107922 - 0.0000558 0.0016608 - 0.0625 0.0200046
best seller 107922 - 0.0001497 0.0022142 - 0.0260756 0.0246914
wrong item 107922 0.0094492 0.0131771 - 0.1 0.1
awesome service 107922 0.0023027 0.0030124 - 0.0454545 0.037037
very slow 107922 - 0.0002231 0.002425 - 0.0201702 0.0100266
quickly advertised 107922 - 0.0002472 0.0028828 - 0.0454545 0.0909091
several weeks 107922 - 0.0001075 0.0030191 - 0.047619 0.047619
late shipped 107922 - 0.0005365 0.0025033 - 0.0236686 0.02
defective product 107922 - 0.0000367 0.0009372 - 0.125 0.0129032
bad shape 107922 -1.13e-06 0.0015334 - 0.0454545 0.0454545
not advertised 107922 - 0.0001909 0.0036066 - 0.0769231 0.0769231
happy service 107922 - 0.000217 0.0020874 - 0.0242424 0.0242424
very impressed 107922 - 0.0003181 0.0034756 - 0.1666667 0.1111111
later received 107922 - 0.0004482 0.0069506 - 0.2 0.0363636
not arrived 107922 - 0.0001429 0.0050211 - 0.1666667 0.0833333
top quality 107922 - 0.0003333 0.0032658 - 0.047619 0.0338983
friendly service 107922 - 0.002613 0.0218787 -1 1
Table 8 Summary statistics of text variables (modifier-dimension pairs)
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
slow shipping 107922 - 0.0002223 0.0039393 - 0.0526316 0.0526316
superb service 107922 - 0.0000246 0.0017151 - 0.0625 0.0236686
fair condition 107922 - 0.0000553 0.0029515 - 0.3333333 0.0246914
perfect item 107922 0.0053321 0.0064172 - 0.0714286 0.0714286
totally satisfied 107922 - 0.0000489 0.0017618 - 0.037037 0.037037
excellent service 107922 - 0.00004 0.0008413 - 0.02 0.0000195
great merchant 107922 - 0.0001023 0.0026192 - 0.0273973 0.0273973
very fast 107922 - 0.0002404 0.0021852 - 0.0285714 0.0200043
excellent condition 107922 - 0.0000458 0.0027119 - 0.1666667 0.1666667
ahead arrived 107922 - 0.0007818 0.0052645 - 0.1428571 0.1428571
received product 107922 - 0.0000403 0.0007823 - 0.02 0.005
great company 107922 - 0.0003496 0.0036476 - 0.0555556 0.0555556
promptly described 107922 - 0.0003732 0.0033739 - 0.0333333 0.0909091
easy service 107922 - 0.0000147 0.0022246 - 0.02 0.02
quick service 107922 - 0.0028728 0.0148672 - 0.5 0.5
great packaging 107922 - 0.0009077 0.007408 - 0.2 0.1428571
exactly arrived 107922 - 0.0008714 0.0070406 - 0.3333333 0.3333333
Table 9 Continued: Summary statistics of text variables (modifier-dimension pairs)
Ghose, Ipeirotis, and Sundararajan: The Dimensions of Reputation in Electronic Markets
40 Working Paper CeDER-06-02, New York University
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
d0 107922 .2240692 .4169698 0 1
Dummy Negative Fulfillment 107922 .1229314 .3283599 0 1
Dummy Negative Misc 107922 .0266581 .161083 0 1
Dummy Negative Overall 107922 .0257871 .1585005 0 1
Dummy Negative Packaging 107922 .0364152 .1873218 0 1
Dummy Negative Pricing 107922 .0361743 .1867244 0 1
Dummy Negative Product Quality 107922 .5170771 .4997106 0 1
Dummy Negative Representation 107922 .0108875 .1037741 0 1
Dummy Neutral Fulfillment 107922 .1968088 .3975884 0 1
Dummy Neutral Misc 107922 .5882119 .4921594 0 1
Dummy Neutral Overall 107922 .1405923 .3476021 0 1
Dummy Neutral Representation 107922 .0375271 .1900504 0 1
Dummy Neutral Service 107922 .03686 1884188 0 1
Dummy Positive Fulfillment 107922 .4280592 .4947997 0 1
Dummy Positive Misc 107922 .0326532 .1777281 0 1
Dummy Positive Overall 107922 .0615167 .2402767 0 1
Dummy Positive Packaging 107922 .0638239 .2444401 0 1
Dummy Positive Pricing 107922 .0473953 .212484 0 1
d18 107922 0.1199941 0.3249561 0 1
Dummy Positive Representation 107922 .0831248 .2760721 0 1
Dummy Positive Service 107922 .1634328 .3697618 0 1
Negative Fulfillment 107922 -.0669293 .4097874 -1 1
Negative Misc 107922 .0727223 .4256386 -1 1
Negative Overall 107922 -.0702025 .3131249 -1 1
Negative Packaging 107922 -.0617229 .3157939 -1 1
Negative Pricing 107922 -.05948 2592682 1 1
Negative Product quality 107922 -.0270006 .356886 1 1
Negative Representation 107922 .346967 5318592 1 1
Negative Service 107922 -.077595 .3179903 -1 1
Neutral Fulfillment 107922 -.0695362 .3644121 -1 1
Neutral Misc 107922 .0668392 .4338325 -1 1
Neutral Overall 107922 -.0367441 .3115605 -1 1
Neutral Representation 107922 -.0702883 .2825511 -1 1
Neutral Service 107922 -.0753926 .3418242 -1 1
Positive Fulfillment 107922 .179798 4740336 1 1
Positive Misc 107922 -.0639868 .3451978 -1 1
Positive Overall 107922 .059836 4278125 1 1
Positive Packaging 107922 -.0284115 .3897397 -1 1
Positive Pricing 107922 -.0474962 .3812951 -1 1
Positive Product quality 107922 .0563512 .4251948 -1 1
Positive Representation 107922 -.0400379 .438151 1 1
Positive Service 107922 .082349 .183255 1 1
Table 10 Continued: Summary statistics of text variables (modifier-dimension pairs)
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Variable Estimates Estimates
Constant 1.66 (1.24) 8.01∗∗∗ (0.44)
Log(ProductPrice) - 0.15 (0.19) .41∗∗∗ (0.085)
RegDiffRating - 0.14∗∗∗(0.007) .187∗∗∗ (0.012)
Log(RegDiffLife) 0.011∗∗∗(0.0005) 0.051∗∗∗ (0.003)
RegDiffCondition 0.27∗∗∗(0.01) 0.017∗∗∗(0.007)
Log(Competitors) - 2.02∗∗∗(0.01) - 1.42∗∗∗(0.026)
R2(%) 49.35 13.89
Table 11 The effect of average reputation and level of experience on pricing power with Regular Price Premium
as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The first column displays results
with product-seller fixed effects. The second column displays results with product, seller and competitor
fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Variable Estimates
Constant −1.27 (2.04)
Log(ProductPrice) .75∗ (0.39)
AvgDiffRating −0.37∗∗∗ (0.06)
Log(AvgDiffLife) 0.048∗∗∗ (0.008)
AvgDiffCondition 0.11∗∗∗ (0.06)
Log(Competitors) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.03)
R2(%) 13.2
Table 12 The effect of average reputation and level of experience on pricing power with Average Price Premium
as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. This regression has OLS with
product-seller fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Variable Estimate
Log(ProductPrice) −0.84∗∗∗(0.18)
RegDiffrating −0.11∗∗∗(0.012)
RegDiffcondition 0.021∗∗∗(0.006)
Log(RegDiﬄife) 0.038∗∗∗(0.0007)
Log(Competitors) −1.87∗∗∗(0.011)
[Modifier, Dimension] Pair Estimate
[very recommended] 12.47∗∗∗(2.38)
[always excellent] 141.98∗∗∗(34.52)
[excellent communication] 18.38∗∗(7.61)
[terrific condition] 857.55∗∗∗(108.15)
[excellent condition] 8.53∗∗∗(1.93)
[excellent seller] 0.7∗(0.37)
[fast seller] 9.76∗∗∗(2.12)
[best seller] 48.8∗∗∗(4.45)
[perfectly packaged] 37.4∗∗∗(4.26)
[A+++ seller] 49.15∗∗∗(3.87)
[happy service] 21.56∗∗∗(5.11)
[friendly service] 8.21∗∗∗(0.64)
[easy service] 46.17∗∗∗(5.87)
[awesome service] 26.05∗∗∗(4.24)
[very impressive] 21.3∗∗∗(2.91)
[top quality] 16.77∗∗∗(2.41)
[perfect item] 6.92∗∗(1.74)
[excellent purchase ] 89.72∗∗∗(15.47)
[great merchant] 49.33∗∗∗(4.68)
[great company] 21.77∗∗(2.69)
[promptly described] 4.7∗∗(1.09)
[not have] −3.48∗∗∗(0.17)
[not notified] −103.69∗∗∗(23.75)
[not ordered] −13.4∗∗∗(2.09)
[not received] −9.44∗∗∗(3.82)
[not delivered] −12.25∗∗∗(3.02)
[wrong address] −17.54∗∗∗(3.13)
[wrong item] −2.5∗∗∗(0.89)
[never sent] −16.61∗∗∗(4.8)
[never responded] −4.87∗∗(2.15)
[still waiting] −6.38∗∗∗(1.14)
[cancelled order] −5.01∗∗(2.4)
[bad experience] −13.73∗∗∗(4.86)
[not advertised] −9.93∗∗∗(1.41)
[wrong CD] −32.58∗∗∗(12.36)
[wrong Book] −17.39∗∗∗(1.87)
[wrong Game] −41.54∗∗∗(5.31)
[defective product] −13.19∗∗∗(4.4)
R2(%) 62.7
Table 13 Summary of the dimension-modifier pairs in text-based feedback that influence a seller’s pricing power
most strongly. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the log of the
Regular Price Premium. These estimates are based on regressions with product and seller fixed effects.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Variable Estimate
Log(ProductPrice) 0.13(0.09)
RegDiffrating 0.027∗(0.015)
RegDiffcondition 0.021∗∗∗(0.006)
Log(RegDiﬄife) 0.01∗∗∗(0.005)
Log(Competitors) −1.38∗∗∗(0.027)
[Modifier, Dimension] Pair Estimate
[very recommended] 4.17(1.26)
[excellent seller ] 1.6(0.43)
[A+++ seller] 23.12∗∗∗(3.64)
[superb service] 23.67(6.01)
[perfect item] 3.83∗∗(1.77)
[great merchant] 8.31∗∗∗(3.3)
[excellent purchase ] 32.83∗∗∗(9.17)
[very fast] 15.33∗∗∗(4.65)
[great company] 5.55∗∗(2.28)
[easy service] 4.26∗∗∗(1.25)
[happy service] 13.28∗∗∗(4.3)
[great packaging] 2.51∗∗∗(0.69)
[excellent value ] 6.79∗∗∗(1.75)
[excellent response ] 4.33∗∗∗(1.75)
[slow shipping] −5.9∗∗∗(1.35)
[very slow] −13.58∗∗∗(1.94)
[never delivered] −20.37∗∗∗(4.17)
[never heard] −65.16∗∗∗(7.70)
[several weeks] −14.46∗∗∗(3.27)
[yet have] −6.07∗∗∗(2.19)
[not received] −9.36∗∗∗(1.69)
[not arrived] −10.56∗∗∗(3.76)
[not shipped] −5.15∗∗(2.29)
[late shipped] −11.06∗∗(5.35)
[bad experience] −16.43∗∗∗(3.3)
[poor condition] −35.54∗∗∗(7.16)
[not advertised] −18.40∗∗∗(3.82)
[wrong address] −5.49∗(1.02)
[wrong item] −1.31∗∗(0.61)
[wrong CD] −22.75∗∗∗(9.08)
R2(%) 19.66
Table 14 Summary of the dimension-modifier pairs in text-based feedback that influence a seller’s pricing power
most strongly. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the log of the
Regular Price Premium. These estimates are based on regressions with product, seller and competitor
fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Variable Estimate
Log(ProductPrice) 0.14(0.44)
AvgDiffrating −0.11(0.095)
AvgDiffcondition 0.01(0.05)
Log(AvgDiﬄife) 0.099∗∗∗(0.009)
Log(Competitors) 0.356∗∗∗(0.045)
Modifier, Dimension] Pair Estimate
[very recommended] 15.21∗∗∗(3.14)
[always excellent] 60.8∗∗∗(20.25)
[super transaction] 10.47∗∗(5.17)
[great person] 10.81∗∗∗(3.76)
[awesome transaction] 13.28∗∗∗(3.28)
[excellent communication] 8.06∗∗(3.77)
[excellent condition] 7.58∗∗∗(2.3)
[terrific condition] 1237.42∗∗∗(354.67)
[fast seller] 5.97∗∗(2.87)
[A+++ seller] 14.12∗∗(6.86)
[definitely recommend] 11.04∗∗∗(3.78)
[happy service] 13.75∗∗(6.87)
[easy service] 17.45∗∗(3.94)
[quick service] 3.89∗∗∗(1.33)
[top quality] 9.7∗∗∗(3.21)
[ahead arrived] 8.11∗∗∗(2.87)
[exactly arrived] 5.83∗∗∗(1.46)
[great shape] 2.66∗∗(1.2)
[excellent product] 3.1∗∗(1.28)
[very satisfied] 1.5∗∗(0.75)
[just advertised] 4.0∗∗∗(1.34)
[great buying] 12.42∗∗∗(3.61)
[good seller] 3.2∗∗(1.05)
[superb service] 36.68∗∗∗(13.01)
[perfect item] 13.914∗∗∗(3.05)
[totally satisfied] 12.72∗∗(6.1)
[not have] −3.33∗∗∗(1.09)
[poor condition] −15.73∗∗∗(4.74)
[fair condition] −10.57∗∗∗(3.8)
[not notified] −42.15∗∗∗(15.14)
[not shipped] −8.84∗∗(4.19)
[wrong item] −6.36∗∗∗(2.49)
[bad shape] −10.53∗∗(4.86)
[slow shipping] −8.03∗∗∗(2.98)
[wrong address] −12.94∗∗∗(3.52)
[never got] −1.71∗(0.98)
[never received] −5.12∗∗(2.13)
[never delivered] −26.73∗∗∗(8.89)
R2(%) 51.32
Table 15 Summary of the dimension-modifier pairs in text-based feedback that influence a seller’s pricing power
most strongly. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the log of the
Average Price Premium. These estimates are based on regressions with product and seller fixed effects.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Dimension Human Recall Computer Recall
Product Condition (Product Quality) 0.76 0.76
Price (Pricing) 0.91 0.61
Package (Packaging) 0.96 0.66
Overall Experience (Overall) 0.65 0.55
Delivery Speed (Fulfillment) 0.96 0.92
Item Description (Representation) 0.22 0.43
Product Satisfaction (Product Quality) 0.68 0.58
Problem Response (Misc) 0.30 0.37
Customer Service (Service) 0.57 0.50
Average 0.66 0.60
Table 16 The recall of our technique compared to the recall of the human annotators. In parenthesis the
corresponding dimensions that we identified when clustering the individual modifier-dimensions pairs.
Features Accuracy on Test Set
Price 55%
Price + Numeric Reputation 74%
Price + Numeric Reputation 89%
+ Text Reputation
Price + Text Reputation 87%
Table 17 Predicting the merchant who makes the sale.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
RegDiffRating -0.983(.0137)*** -0.975(.014)*** -0.87(.0135)*** -0.34(.017)***
RegDiffCondition 0.411(.0179)*** 0.413(.018)*** 0.59(.0176)*** 0.26(.0178)***
RegDiffLife -0.0929(.0024)*** -0.092(.0024)*** 0.064(.01)*** -0.066(.002)***
RegDiffLife Squared -0.05(.0006)***
Variance RegDiffLife 0.946(.0159)***
Log Product Price -0.0114 (.006)* -0.011(.006)* -0.015 (.006)** -0.0165(.006)***
Log (Competitors) 0.5547(.0503)*** 0.555 (.05)*** 0.398(.049)*** 0.3985(.049)***
R2(%) 4.6 5.25 6.9 16.65
Table 18 Results from the numeric variables that influence a seller’s pricing power most strongly. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the log of the Regular Price Premium. These
estimates are based on regressions with product-seller fixed effects. *, ** and *** denote significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The first column includes all sellers in our sample, the second
columns includes only sellers with less than 100,000 transactions, the third column controls for the
rate of increase in seller size and the fourth column includes the variance of the numeric rating.
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Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
RegDiffRating -0.91485 (0.014238)*** -0.91059 (0.014366)*** -0.84711(0.013946)*** -0.3577(.0173)***
RegDiffCondition -0.11952 (0.002682)*** -0.11901 ( 0.002694)*** 0.604662 (0.0174)*** 0.29769(.01748)***
RegDiffLife 0.41727 (0.017597)*** 0.42053 (0.017917)*** 0.57962 (0.01026)*** -0.0862(.0027)***
RegDiffLife Squared -0.04922 (0.0007)***
Variance RegDiffLife 0.8742(.0159)***
Log Product Price -0.00949 (0.00618) -0.0092 (0.00621) -0.01213 (0.006043) -.01313(.006)**
Log (Competitors) 0.72182 (0.04935)*** 0.71871 (0.049661)*** 0.58068 (0.04827)*** .56738(.0487)***
Negative Fulfillment 0.9058 (0.02276)*** 0.89201 (0.023039)*** 0.78817 (0.0223)*** 0.7945 (.0225)***
Negative Misc -0.34512 (0.0214)*** -0.35065 (0.02158)*** -0.26099 (0.02094)*** -0.439 (0.0211)***
Negative Overall -0.45022 (0.05138)*** -0.45008 (0.05177)*** -0.47257 (0.05021)*** -0.382 (0.05)***
Negative Packaging 0.1765(0.07991)** 0.18575 (0.080985)** 0.142676 (0.078092)* 0.2360(.0787)***
Negative Pricing -0.37298 (0.097532)*** -0.36952 (0.09787)*** -0.15848 (0.09535)* -0.265(.0961)***
Negative Product Quality -0.90038 (0.119665)*** -0.90301 (0.120208)*** -0.52578 (0.11705)*** -1.179 (.118)***
Negative Representation 0.500851 (0.015115)*** 0.490415 (0.01522)*** 0.456036 (0.014783)*** 0.404 (.0150)***
Negative Service -0.33007 (0.04704)*** -0.3261 (0.047457)*** -0.3556 (0.045972)*** -0.194(0.046)***
Neutral Fulfillment -0.27286 (0.02593)*** -0.26056 (0.02617)*** -0.1461 (0.0254)*** -0.40467(.025)***
Neutral Misc -0.93181 (0.02334)*** -0.92069 (0.02356)*** -0.94764 (0.0228)*** -0.8886 (.023)***
Neutral Overall -1.17169 (0.093789)*** -1.18781 (0.09503)*** -1.13184 (0.09164)*** -1.071(.0924)***
Neutral Representation 0.278814 (0.058851)*** 0.278148 (0.05905)*** 0.207855 (0.057516)*** 0.222(.058)***
Neutral Service -0.18202 (0.043417)*** -0.17207 (0.04449)*** -0.10965 (0.04243)*** -.1601(.0428)***
Positive Fulfillment 0.09167 (0.018601)*** 0.086293 (0.018779)*** 0.04088 (0.01819)** .0026 (.0184)
Positive Misc -0.68029 (0.040474)*** -0.68008 (0.04072)*** -0.58382 (0.03957)*** -0.719 (.039)***
Positive Overall 0.08494 (0.02353)*** 0.0909 (0.023782)*** 0.00807 (0.02302) 0.0708(.0232)***
Positive Packaging 0.618855 (0.03336)*** 0.62857 (0.03359)*** 0.67039 (0.0326)*** 0.6435 (.032)***
Positive Pricing 0.03711 (0.03198) 0.0282 (0.032426) 0.07101 (0.03125)** 0.0232 (.0315)
Positive Product Quality -0.1742 (0.017711)*** -0.16886 (0.01785)*** -0.25546 (0.01734)*** -0.1781(.0174)***
Positive Representation 0.08558 (0.017243)*** 0.08849 (0.01739)*** -0.00124 (0.01689) 0.08819 (.017)***
Positive Service 0.16423 (0.019137*** 0.16087 (0.01929)*** 0.04672 (0.01877)* 0.1276 (.0188)***
R2(%) 13.5 14.5 15.5 22.7
Table 19 Results from the analysis of the dimensions in text-based feedback that influence a seller’s pricing
power most strongly. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the log of
the Regular Price Premium. These estimates are based on regressions with product-seller fixed effects.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The first column includes all sellers
in our sample, the second columns includes only sellers with less than 100,000 transactions, the third
column controls for the rate of increase in seller size and the fourth column includes the variance of
the numeric rating.
Ghose, Ipeirotis, and Sundararajan: The Dimensions of Reputation in Electronic Markets
Working Paper CeDER-06-02, New York University 47
Variable Estimate Estimate
RegDiffRating 0.071(-5.760)*** -0.72(0.015)***
RegDiffCondition -0.122(0.012)*** -0.18(0.002)***
RegDiffLife 0.161(0.051)*** 0.42(0.017)***
Log Product Price 0.140(0.268) -0.114(0.006)*
Log (Competitors) 0.241(0.093)*** 0.45(0.05)***
Dummy Negative Fulfillment -0.359(0.307) -.066(0.161)
Dummy Negative Misc -0.51(0.3)* -0.2(0.16)
Dummy Negative Overall -0.567(0.322)* 0.7(0.18)***
Dummy Negative Pricing -0.58(0.31)* 0.27(0.17)
Dummy Negative Product Quality -0.248(0.305) 0.27(0.18)
Dummy Negative Representation -0.569(0.307)* 0.002(0.16)
Dummy Negative Service -0.528(0.316)* 0.2(0.2)
Dummy Neutral Fulfillment -1.067(0.989) 0.67(0.14)***
Dummy Neutral Misc -1.119(0.997) 0.44(0.14)***
Dummy Neutral Overall -1.192(0.994) 0.25(0.13)*
Dummy Neutral Representation -1.143(0.985) 0.34(0.15)**
Dummy Positive Fulfillment -0.24(0.127)* 0.16(0.1)
Dummy Positive Overall -0.25(0.13)* 0.03(0.11)
Dummy Positive Packaging -0.480(0.157)*** -0.051(0.11)
Dummy Positive Pricing -0.383(0.091)*** 0.002(0.01)
Dummy Positive Product Quality -0.316(0.123)*** -0.026(0.1)
Dummy Positive Representation -0.091(0.126) 0.13(0.11)
Dummy Positive Service -0.381(0.133)*** -0.17(0.1)
Negative Fulfillment -0.035(0.070) 0.98 (.027)***
Negative Misc -0.055(0.063) - 0.12 (.026)***
Negative Overall 0.094(0.080) -0.529(.026)***
Negative Packaging -0.412(0.081)*** -0.054(0.026)**
Negative Pricing 0.001(0.076) -0.052(0.029)*
Negative Product Quality -0.621(0.112)*** 0.005(0.03)
Negative Representation 0.247(0.065)*** 1.06(0.024)***
Negative Service 0.39(0.091)*** 0.48(0.03)***
Neutral Fulfillment -0.224(0.059)*** -0.99(0.025)***
Neutral Misc -0.278(0.078)*** -0.798(0.04)***
Neutral Overall -0.052(0.077) -1.12(0.038)***
Neutral Representation 0.191(0.089)** 0.62(0.028)***
Neutral Service 0.258(0.091)*** 0.82(0.026)***
Positive Fulfillment -0.227(0.050)*** -0.45(0.027)***
Positive Misc -0.208(0.086)*** -0.65(0.026)***
Positive Overall -0.060(0.040) 0.087(0.024)***
Positive Packaging 0.313(0.073)*** 0.62(0.025)***
Positive Pricing -0.112(0.072) -0.05(0.025)**
Positive Product Quality -0.271(0.051)*** -0.092(0.022)***
Positive Representation -0.342(0.051)*** 0.018(0.02)
Positive Service 0.083(0.052) 0.29(0.025)***
Sum Positive 0.130 (0.059)** 0.323 (0.025)***
Sum Neutral 0.084 (0.079) 0.126(0.031)***
Sum Negative -0.067(0.062) -0.06 (0.03)**
R2(%) 19.2 18.3
Table 20 Regression showing that an increase in the score of a seller’s distinguishing characteristic increases
their pricing power. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the log of the
Regular Price Premium. These estimates are based on regressions with product-seller fixed effects. *,
** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Figure 6 A snapshot of the revised reputation system of Amazon.com, incorporating instructions that ask users
to evaluate merchants across specific dimensions. (This version first appeared on Amazon.com in Spring
2006.)
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Figure 7 A snapshot of the revised reputation system of Amazon.com, incorporating explicit form elements for the
buyers to evaluate merchants across specific dimensions. (This version first appeared on Amazon.com
in late Summer 2006.)
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